Abstract: A secret image sharing (SIS) scheme inserts a secret message into shadow images in a way that if shadow images are combined in a specific way, the secret image can be recovered. A 2-out-of-2 sharing digital image scheme (SDIS) adopts a color palette to share a digital color secret image into two shadow images, and the secret image can be recovered from two shadow images, while any one shadow image has no information about the secret image. This 2-out-of-2 SDIS may keep the shadow size small because by using a color palette, and thus has advantage of reducing storage. However, the previous works on SDIS are just 2-out-of-2 scheme and have limited functions. In this paper, we take the lead to study a general n-out-of-n SDIS which can be applied on more than two shadow. The proposed SDIS is implemented on the basis of 2-out-of-2 SDIS. Our main contribution has the higher contrast of binary meaningful shadow and the larger region in color shadows revealing cover image when compared with previous 2-out-of-2 SDISs. Meanwhile, our SDIS is resistant to colluder attack.
Introduction
A secret image sharing (SIS) scheme inserts a secret message into shadow images in a way that if shadow images are combined in a specific way, the secret image can be recovered. A SIS scheme is usually referred to by a threshold (k, n) SIS, where k ≤ n, and can insert a secret image into n shadow images (referred to as shadows). In a (k, n)-SIS, we may recover the secret image by using any k shadows, but cannot recover the secret image from (k − 1) or fewer shadows. There are various types of SIS. Here, we give a brief survey for three major types of SIS schemes: the visual cryptography scheme (VC), the polynomial-based SIS (PSIS), and the bit-wise Boolean-operation based SIS.
The so-called VC [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] has a novel stacking-to-see property such that the involved participants can easily stack shadows to visually decode the secret through the human eye. This property makes VC applicable in many scenarios. Although VC has the ease of decoding, it has poor visual quality of reconstructed image. Another SIS adopts (k − 1)-degree polynomial like Shamir's secret sharing [7] to design (k, n)-PSIS [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] . There are two major differences between VC and PSIS: the quality of recovered image and the decoding method. Unlike VC provided with the poor visual quality, the recovered secret image of PSIS is distortion-less. However, the decoding of VC only needs stacking operation but PSIS uses the computation of Lagrange interpolation to recover secret image. Some SIS schemes are based on Boolean operations [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] . Note: the stacking operation of VC, strictly speaking, is also a Boolean OR operation. However, this OR operation of VC is pixel-wise operation, which applied on black-and-white dots. However, Boolean operation in [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] is bit-wise operations, and can obtain a high-quality secret image (a distortion-less image like PSIS scheme). Besides, using -wise Boolean has much lower complexity when compared with Lagrange interpolation.
Preliminaries
Notations in this paper and their descriptions are listed in Table 1 . These notations are used throughout the whole paper to describe all the schemes, Wei et al.'s (2, 2)-SDIS [17] , Yang et al.'s (2, 2)-SDIS [19] , and the proposed (n, n)-SDIS.
In [17] , Wei et al. first proposed a simple (2, 2)-SDIS to insert a 256-color digital image SI into two binary noise-like shadows (NS 1 and NS 2 ). In Wei et al.'s (2, 2)-SDIS, every 9-bit block B, i.e., b 1 − b 9 , is obtained from the 256-color secret image SI and the color palette CP. Afterwards, the block B is subdivided into two blocks B (1) and B (2) on shadow 1 NS 1 and shadow 2 NS 2 , respectively, by using XOR operation. As shown in Figure 1 , B = B (1) ⊕ B (2) , where each bit b i = b (1) i ⊕ b (2) i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 9. Both shadow blocks of B (1) and B (2) are Y blocks. Accomplish all blocks until all pixels in SI and the data in CP are processed. Because every pixel in SI is represented as a block, shadow sizes are nine times expanded. The first 8 bits b 1 − b 8 in B represents a color index, and the ninth bit b 9 in every block of NS 1 (i.e., the bit b
(1) 9 ) is collected to covey the CP information. Therefore, from the XOR-ed results NS 1 ⊕ NS 2 we may obtain color indices and the CP to recover SI. There are other two types of shadows for Wei et al.'s (2, 2)-SDIS. Noise-like shadows (NS 1 , NS 2 ) can be extended to two binary meaningful shadows (BS 1 , BS 2 ) and two color meaningful shadows (CS 1 , CS 2 ), on which binary cover image BCI and color cover image CCI can be, respectively, visually viewed. In addition, Wei et al.'s (2, 2)-SDIS can also be extended to directly insert a true color SI without using CP. 
Notation Description

CP
a 256-color color palette SI a secret image with the size with the size (M × N) pixels CCI, BCI binary (black-and-white) over image and color cover image with the size (M × N) pixels NS i n noise-like shadows with the size (3M × 3N) (respectively, (5M × 5N)) subpixels for 256-color (respectively, true color) secret image, where i = 1, 2, ..., n BS i binary meaningful shadows with the size (3M × 3N) (respectively, (5M × 5N)) subpixels for 256-color (respectively, true color) secret image CS i color meaningful shadows with the size (3M × 3N) (respectively, (5M × 5N)) subpixels for 256-color (respectively, true color) secret image 
9 ) are 5B4W blocks. For the corresponding position of this secret pixel pi, the cover pixels of BCI 1 and BCI 2 are white and black, respectively. We reverse the shadow B (1) = (b
9 ) = (110001101) block to (001110010) (4W5B) to represent the white color pixel in BCI 1 , and we do not change B (2) 
9 ) = (010110101) (5B4W) to represent the black color pixel in BCI 2 . In secret recovery, the color index can be easily derived from the exclusive OR result from (b
In addition, the CP data can be obtained from every b
(1) 9 in BS 1 . However, Wei et al's (2, 2)-SDIS has some weaknesses. For the color index 255, it has a problem with embedding the data of color palette. In addition, Wei et al.'s (2, 2)-SDIS with color meaningful shadows cannot correctly extract the block data for white cover pixels, and this will cause erroneous recovery in the secret image. Moreover, Wei et al.'s SDIS uses Y blocks on both shadows. Five black dots in a block B may not sufficiently demonstrate the visual quality of meaningful shadows.
It is obvious that more black subpixels in every block may enhance the visual quality of meaningful shadows BS 1 and BS 2 , and CS 1 and CS 2 . Accordingly, in [19] , Yang et al. adopted X block and Y block half and half on blocks B (1) and B (2) , such that the average number of black subpixels in B (1) and B (2) is enhanced from 5 to 5.5. This enhancement improved the visual quality of meaningful shadows. Meanwhile, Yang et al.'s (2, 2)-SDIS also solved the other two weaknesses of Wei et al.'s (2, 2)-SDIS.
Motivation and Design Concept
As described in Section 2, there are three weaknesses in Wei et al.'s SDIS: (1) the incorrect assignment of the color palette data for the color index 255, (2) the partial regions in meaningful shadows showing the content of the cover image, and (3) the erroneous recovery in secret image if the cover pixel is white in color meaningful shadows. Yang et al.'s (2, 2)-SDIS already tackled these weaknesses.
By delving into these three weaknesses, we can see that the third weakness is a minor weakness caused from an intrinsic nature of color. A trivial approach in [19] , using a near white color pixel instead of white pixels in cover image, is very efficient in addressing this weakness. Therefore, the approach can be still adopted in the proposed (n, n)-SDIS for solving this minor weakness. Our contribution is not just the extension from 2-out-of-2 scheme to n-out-of-n scheme. The proposed (n, n)-SDIS, where n ≥ 3, has better solutions for other two major weaknesses. Because the number of shadows is more than two, we can easily solve the first weaknesses (note: the detail will be described in Section 3). However, Yang et al.'s (2, 2)-SDIS uses a very complicated approach by partitioned sets to solve this weakness. For the second weakness, our (n, n)-SDIS uses X blocks in most shadows This approach has large average black subpixels in shadow blocks to enhance visual qualities of meaningful shadows. In addition, the proposed (n, n)-SDIS embeds the CP information in b 9 but both (2, 2)-SDISs [17, 19] use b
(1) 9 in shadow block B (1) . The bit b 9 obtained from the XOR-ed result B is more securely protected than the bit b Suppose that T is a 9-bit temporary block. Equations (1) and (2) are main statements in this paper, on which we can design the proposed (n, n)-SDIS. As shown in Equation (1), we may randomly generate (n − 2) X blocks B (i j ) , 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 2, and then determine a temporary block T via these (n − 2) blocks and the block B (see upper equation in Equation (1)). 
Equation (2) implies that the block B can be subdivide into n shadow blocks B (1) , B (2) , ..., B (n) , and meanwhile can be recovered from B = B (1) ⊕ ... ⊕ B (n) . All the n shadows in the proposed (n, n)-SDIS are illustrated in Figure 2 . The operation of lower equation in Equation (1) using Wei et al.' (2, 2)-SDIS is shown in Figure 2a , and using Yang et al.'s (2, 2)-SDIS is shown in Figure 2b . Moreover, in [17] , the authors claimed that the (2, 2)-SDIS has a novel application to cover the transmission of confidential images. For example, as a supplementary aid to existing symmetric cryptography standards like DES which requires a pre-shared key, the (2, 2)-SDIS remains a safe and less risky means for key distribution. Because the prosed scheme is extended from 2-out-of-2 to n-out-of-n, it implies that our (n, n)-SDIS can be applied on a group key distribution, which includes n members in this group. Besides the application in key distribution, the proposed scheme can be also applied to protection of secret image among multiple users. For instance, the colorful image of traffic or medical information are confidential, and our scheme provides a secure and high efficiency approach to safely keeping such image among n users, only all n users are able to recover the image with high quality. 
Sharing and Recovering Algorithms
A block diagram of the proposed (n, n)-SDIS is illustrated in Figure 3 . Shadows NS 1 − NS n are noise-like, which is the same as Boolean-operation based SIS [18] . For the proposed (n, n)-SDIS, we can complement the blocks for the corresponding white cover pixels to generate binary meaningful shadows (BS 1 − BS n ) from noise-like shadows (NS 1 − NS n ), i.e., 6B3W (or 5B4W) for black color and 3B6W (or 4B5W) for white color. However, the scheme in [18] does dot has this property. On the other hand, to implement color meaningful shadows (CS 1 , CS n ), the 1s in blocks are replaced with the color of the corresponding cover pixel, and leave 0s blank. Therefore, we only describe how to generate noise-like shadows, and how to recover the secret image and color palette from n noise-like shadows. 
(S-3) By (n − 2) random blocks and the block B, calculate the temporary block
, we reduce its Hamming weight to H(T) = 7 via modifying any one shadow block of {B (i 1 ) , ..., B (i n−2 ) }.
/* (1) In Lemma 1, we prove that the reduction of Hamming weight can always be accomplished (2) After step (S-4), the Hamming weight distribution is 0
/* In Lemma 2, we prove that {B (j 1 ) , B (j 2 ) } can be obtained from Y(T) for odd H(T), and from W(T) for even H(T). */ (S-6) Process all the blocks, and output shadow blocks B (1) ...B (n) on n noise-like shadows NS 1 − NS n , respectively.
Recovering procedure:
/* Theorem 1, demonstrates that we can obtain the original block from B = (B (1) ⊕ ... ⊕ B (n) ) */ (S-2) Recover the color index (b 1 − b 8 ) and the data of color palette b 9 , respectively, from B. (S-3) Repeat the above until all blocks in NS 1 ⊕ ... ⊕ NS n are processed, and finally SI and CP can be recovered.
Extension of (n, n)-SDIS to Share True Color Secret Image
Same as (2, 2)-SDIS and VC in [5] , the proposed (n, n)-SDIS can be used to share a true color image. To share a true color secret image, we use a 25-subpixel block B r , which the first three 8-tuples, r 1 , ..., r 8 , g 1 , ..., g 8 , and bl 1 , ..., bl 8 , are used to represent R, G and B color planes. The other one bit in B r is p 9 . This 25-subpixel block B r is shown in Figure 4a . Because we share R, G and B colors directly, we do not need to use the bit p 9 to covey any information. Thus, this bit p 9 could be abandoned, or used as authentication bits to provide authentication capability like VC in [6] and PSIS in [10] . Collect (x 1 ...x 8 ), where x ∈ {r, g, bl}, and append the bit p 9 to form red, green, and blue shadow blocks B x where x ∈ {r, g, bl} as shown in Figure 4b . Detailed procedures of the proposed (n, n)-SDIS for sharing and recovering true color image are briefly described step by step as follows.
Sharing procedure:
(S -1) Obtain 24-bit true color r 1 , ..., r 8 , g 1 , ..., g 8 , and bl 1 , ..., bl 8 from the secret image SI, and random generate a bit p 9 to form a 25-bit block B r , as shown in Figure 4a . /* Parity bit p 9 is not used to covey any information, and thus it can be randomly generated */ (S -2) Subdivide the true color block B T to red, green, and blue shadow blocks B r , B g , B bl . (S -3) Using B r , B g , B bl as 9-bit block B in (S-1), respectively, to generate n shadow blocks B
bl , and append a black subpixel in the 25-th subpixel to generate a 25-bit shadow block B (i) , where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. /* Because we do not use the 25-th bit p 9 in the XOR-ed result B T to convey any information, we can use black subpixel in 25-th subpixel for all shadow blocks to enhance the number of black subpixels. */ (S -5) Process all the blocks, and output blocks B (1) − B (n) on n noise-like shadows NS 1 − NS n , respectively.
Recovering procedure: 
Enhancing Visual Quality of Color Meaningful Shadow
Consider sharing 256-color (respectively, true color) SI, noise-like shadows NS i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, are 3M × 3N (respectively, 5M × 5N) times expanded. Based on noise-like shadow NS i , we can fill in 1s in shadow blocks with the color of the corresponding cover pixel in CCI, and leave 0s blank to generate color meaningful shadow CS i . Consider the case sharing 256-color SI. As shown in Figure 5a , there is a pixel with a blue color C in CCI. Suppose that the block B (i) at corresponding position for this Figure 5b) , and this block B (i) is a X block with 6B3W sub-pixels (see see Figure 5c ). By putting the blue cover pixel C into all black sub-pixels in Figure 5c , we have color meaningful shadow CS (i) in Figure 5d . Noise-like shadow and color meaningful shadow have the same size 3M × 3N subpixels and 9 times expanded when compared with CCI. As shown in Figure 5d , the color at 1s in a block are the same. This is because SI and CCI have the same size with M × N pixels. To enhance visual quality of CS i , we use a large color cover image CCI with 3M × 3N pixels (note: the original CCI has only M × N pixels). Obviously, this larger CCI has the high resolution than CCI. As shown in Figure 6 , our new approach uses a large CCI (see Figure 6a) . By putting the color pixels in to into all 1s of B (1) in Figure 6b , we have the CS i in Figure 6c . Because the color meaningful shadow CS i has more colors, and will have the high resolution. By the same argument, this approach can also be applied to sharing true color SI. 
Theorem and Security Analysis
Main Theorems and Examples
Lemma 1. Suppose that the block T in Equation (1) is all-1 block, i.e., H(T) = 9. We may change any two positions (one is 1 → 0 and the other is 0 → 1) in any one block
holds, and H(T) is reduced from 9 to 7. Meanwhile, all (n − 2) blocks B (i j ) , 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 2, are still X blocks.
Proof. As shown in Equation (1), all these (n − 2) blocks B (i 1 ) − B (i n−2 ) are X blocks. We choose one block B (i j ) , and modify any two positions of 1 → 0 and 0 → 1. This modification will change the 1 in the block T to 0 at these two chosen modified positions. After that, H(T) is reduced to 9 − 2 = 7. Meanwhile, because we change two positions by 1 → 0 and 0 → 1, respectively, the Hamming weight H(B (i j ) ) is unchanged, and this shadow block B (i j ) is still a X block.
Lemma 2. Blocks B (j 1 ) , B (j 2 ) in step (S-5) can be obtained from Y(T) for odd H(T), and from W(T) for even H(T).
Proof. 
Consider the XOR-ed block (X 1 ⊕ Y 2 ). Because blocks X 1 and Y 2 have Hamming weights 6 and 5, respectively. The number of positions of 1 → 0 and 0 → 1 crossing from vectors X 1 to Y 2 should differ with one. Suppose that the number crossing from vectors X 1 to Y 2 of 1 → 0 is x + 1, and the number of 0 → 1 is x. Therefore, the (X 1 ⊕ Y 2 ) has the following form (see Equation (4)), where 0 ≤ x ≤ 3. The Hamming weight of (X 1 Y 2 ) in Equation (4) is (2x + 1), and thus H(X 1 ⊕ Y 2 ) may be 1, 3, 5, 7. The following theorem shows that the proposed (n, n)-SDIS is a n-out-of-n sharing scheme that we can recover SI and CP from n noise-like shadows (NS 1 − NS n ), and cannot obtain SI and CP from (n − 1) or fewer shadows. Theorem 1. The proposed (n, n)-SDIS is n-out-of-n sharing scheme that the XOR-ed result of n shadow blocks can represent 0 255 color indices and the data of color palette.
Proof. We first prove that sharing procedure can successfully generate n shadow blocks
Suppose that a block B = ( ) is composed of 8-bit color index (0 255) and 1-bit data of color palette, which are obtained from SI and CP. By Equation (1), we first randomly generate (n − 2) X blocks B (i j ) , 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 2, and then calculate the temporary block
After step (S-4), the Hamming weight distribution of H(T) is 0 8 (see Lemma 1) . By Lemma 2, we can obtain {B j 1 , B (j 2 ) } from Y(T) (respectively, W(T)) for odd (1, 3, 5, 7) (respectively, even (0, 2, 4, 6, 8) H(T). Finally, we have n shadow blocks {B 1 , ..., B n }. Process all the blocks, and we can generate n noise-like shadows. Next, we consider the recovery. As shown in Equation (2) , we have R W < R Y < R P The contrast is the difference of blackness for black block and white block. In binary meaningful shadows BS 1 − BS n , we complement the blocks for the corresponding white cover pixels to generate white shadow blocks. Thus, if the number of black subpixels in a black shadow block is n B , then the he number black subpixels in a white shadow block is 9 − n B . Thus, we have C W = we have C W < C Y ≤ C P .
An illustrative example gives a quick understanding for the proposed (n, n)-SDIS. By step (S-2), we randomly generate two X blocks (say B (1) , B (2) ). Suppose that these two random blocks are B (1) = (101110110) and B (2) = (111101001) with H(B (1) ) = H(B (2) ) = 6, and then we obtain the temporary block T via the following equation.
Because of H(T) = 9, we should modify any two positions (one is 1 → 0 and the other is 0 → 1) in one block (say B (2) ), to reduce H(T) from 9 to 7. For example, we may modify B (2) as (111101100). Finally, we have T = (111111010) with H(T) = 7, and meanwhile the new block B (2) = (111101100) is still a X block. Since H(T) = 7 is odd, we apply Yang et al.'s (2, 2)-SDIS to obtain Y(111111010) = 7, which can be determined from Equation (7). Finally, all four shadow blocks are B (1) = (101110110), B (2) = (111101100), B (3) = (110110101), B (4) = (001001111), where B (1) , B (2) , B (3) are X blocks, and B (4) is Y block.
Consider another case (c, d) = (49, 1). We have the block B = ( 49 001100011, 1 1 ) 2 . From step (S-2), we randomly select two X blocks (say B (1) , B (2) ). Suppose that these two random blocks are B (1) = (011111001) and B (2) = (110011011), and then we obtain the temporary block T via Equation (8) .
Since H(T) = 2 is even, we apply Wei et al.'s (2, 2)-SDIS to obtain Y(100000001) = (B (3) , B (4) ), which can be determined from Equation (9) . Finally, all four blocks are B Let R P be the ratio of average numbers of black subpixels in a 25-bit shadow block for the proposed (n, n)-SDIS sharing true color image. The following theorem demonstrates R P > R P , i.e., the meaningful shadows of sharing true color secret image have the better visual quality than those of sharing 256-color secret image.
Theorem 3.
The ratio of average numbers of black subpixels in a 25-bit block for the proposed (n, n)-SDIS sharing true color image is R P = 
Because the 25-th bit in shadow block is always 1, and thus the value of R P is determined as 1.5/9 n 6−1.5/n 9 = R P (11)
Security Analysis: The (n − 1)-Colluder Attack
Here, we consider an attack way that (n − 1) participants collude together and want to figure out SI and CP. The (n − 1)-colluder attack is a very extreme attack for the proposed (n, n)-SDIS, because it needs (n − 1) participants jointly providing their shadows for guessing SI and CP. We first discuss the (n − ≈ 0.01. Both probabilities 0.08 and 0.01 are higher than the brute-force probability 0.004. However, these probabilities 0.08 and 0.01 are still practically secure for guessing 256 colors.
Let the successful probability to recover the block B for (n − 1)-colluder attack, for the proposed (n, n)-SDIS, be P P . In the following theorem, we theoretically prove
).
Theorem 4.
The successful probability to recover the block B in the proposed (n, n)-SDIS for (n − 1)-colluder attack is P P =
), where P W ≤ P Y ≤ P P .
Proof. Suppose that there are (n − 1) shadows (say B (1) − B (n−1) ) for reconstruction, on which we may guess the type of shadow block in the corresponding position of B (n) . The block B (n) has X block and Y block with 2n−3 2n probability and 3 2n probability, respectively, which are derived below.
) probability to guess the correct color index (b 1 ...b 8 ), which is better than brute-force probability 1 256 . Thus, P P is calculated as follows.
Since P W = , we have P W < P Y . About P Y and P P , the relation is derived as follows.
For n = 3, the value of P P is P P = 1/C 5 9 +1/C 6 9 2 = P Y , and P P approaches to 1 C 6 9 for large n. In fact, the value of
012 is almost the same as P y ≈ 0.01. For this extreme case, the (n − 1)-colluder attack, the security of the proposed (n, n)-SDIS is close to that of Yang et al.'s (2, 2)-SDIS. By the same argument, for other cases collecting (n − 2) or shadows, the possible combination of collected shadows is more difficult to analyze compared with collecting (n − 1) shadows, and even less than the brute-force probability.
In the proposed (n, n)-SDIS, the color palette information is conveyed by b 9 (the ninth bit in B), but not the ninth bit b
(1) 9 of the block B (1) in NS 1 . Therefore, the color palette CP may be obtained from only one shadow for Wei et al.'s (2, 2)-SDIS and Yang et al.'s (2, 2)-SDIS. Even though an attacker has the CP information, he still cannot obtain the secret image SI. For the proposed (n, n)-SDIS, the color palette information in B is securely protected and only can be determined from XOR-ing n blocks B (1) ⊕ ... ⊕ B (n) . This makes the cryptanalysis is more difficult for the proposed (n, n)-SDIS. The following theorem demonstrates the successful probability P C to recover a correct color in CP for the proposed (n, n)-SDIS when collecting (n − 1) shadows.
Theorem 5.
The successful probability to recover a correct color in CP for the proposed (n, n)-SDIS when collecting (n − 1) shadows is P C = ( Proof. Each color information in CP is encapsulated in 24 blocks, which every block should be derived from B = B (1) ⊕ ... ⊕ B (n) . If colluders have (n − 1) shadows (say NS 1 − NS n−1 ), for a block B, they have the XOR-ed result B = B (1) ⊕ ... ⊕ B (n−1) , and can guess that the shadow block B (n) is X block and Y block with 2n−3 2n probability and 3 2n probability, respectively. For X block, it implies that we have 6 9 probability that the bit b 9 is the complementary bit b 9 in B . On the other hand, we have 5 9 probability that the bit b 9 is the complementary bit b 9 in B for Y block. Therefore, the average probability of guessing b 9 is derived as
n Note: every block has one-bit color palette information, and a true color is represented by 24-bit R, G, and B color planes. Because colluders can guess the bit b 9 with 2 3 − 1/6 n probability, P C is (
Therefore, the value P C = ( Experiments E and F demonstrate binary and color meaningful shadows for (4, 4)-SDIS and (5, 5)-SDIS, respectively. In Experiment G, we redo Experiment C to enhance the visual quality of color meaningful shadows by using the approach in Figure 6 .
Evaluation and Comparisons
Experimental Results
Seven experiments (Experiments
In all experiments, five binary cover images BCI 1 − BCI 5 with black-and-white printed texts A , B , C , D , E , and five color cover images CCI 1 − CCI 5 with photos of birds are used. In addition, two secret images SI 1 (Lena: 256-color image), SI 2 (Kaleidoscope: true color image) are used. All these images BCI 1 − BCI 5 (see Figure 7) , CCI 1 − CCI 5 (see Figure 8) , and SI 1 , SI 2 (see Figure 9 ) are 256 × 256 pixels. Because shadows may be 9 or 25 times expanded in experiments, for demonstrating all the images in a single page, the shadow images in experiments are not correctly proportional. (see Theorem 2). It is observed that the printed-texts A, B, and C are revealed indeed on BCI 1 − BCI 3 , with the size of 768 × 768 pixels (see Figure 11a -c). Consider recovery. We first transfer the 3B6W block and 4B5W block to 6B3W block and 5B4W block, respectively. Afterwards, via the recovering procedure, we may recover the 256-color secret image Lena.
(a) (b) (c) By adopting the color pixels in CCI 1 − CCI 3 into black subpixels in blocks B (1) , B (2) , and B (3) on NS 1 , NS 2 and NS 3 , respectively, we generate three color meaningful shadows CS 1 − CS 3 with the size of 768 × 768 pixels. Each color meaningful shadow has R P = 6−(1.5/n) 9 = 6−(1.5/3) 9 = 5.5
9 . As shown in Figure 12a -c, it is observed that the images of three photos of birds in Figure 8a -c are revealed on CS 1 − CS 3 . Consider recovery. We first transfer the color subpixel in every block to 1 s and white subpixel to 0 . Afterwards, via the recovering procedure, we may recover the 256-color secret image Lena. Five color cover images printed-texts in Figure 7a -e, and five color cover images CCI 1 − CCI 5 in Figure 8a -e are used. Finally, fiver binary meaningful shadows BS 1 − BS 5 , and five color meaningful shadows CS 1 − CS 5 are illustrated in Figure 15a In Experiment C, three 256 × 256-pixel color cover images CCI 1 − CCI 3 in Figure 8a -c are used. To enhance the visual quality of CS 1 − CS 3 , we use another three 768 × 768-pixel CCI 1 − CCI 3 , which has high resolution. These three images CCI 1 − CCI 3 are omitted here for brevity. By using the approach in Figure 6 , we use color pixels in CCI 1 − CCI 3 into black subpixels in blocks B (1) , B (2) , and B (3) on NS 1 , NS 2 and NS 3 , respectively to generate three color meaningful shadows CS 1 − CS 3 with the size of 768 × 768 pixels. As shown in Figure 16a -c, it is observed that Figure 16 has better visual quality than Figure 12 . However, the photos CCI 1 − CCI 3 used in this experiment may not clearly demonstrate the enhancement. Here, we use a cover image, a colorful centered fractal, for testing. Figure 17(a-1,b-1) shows two color meaningful shadows using the original one and new enhancement, respectively. For clear observation, cropped image areas of Figure 17(a-1,b-1 ) are shown in Figure 17(a-2,b-2) . Visual inspection of cropped image areas in Figure 17(a-2,b-2 ) reveals that the original method spoils some edges and fine details in shadow images. Our enhancement has clear color sharpness, especially the clearness of edges.
For fairer comparison, we adopt visual quality assessment, the structural similarity (SSIM) index, and the feature similarity (FSIM) index to compare Figure 17(a-1) and Figure 17 (b-1) . Let the original image be a colorful centered fractal with the size 768 * 768 pixels. According to the image quality assessment from Laboratory for Computational Vision in New York University (please refer to https://www.cns.nyu.edu/~lcv/ssim/#usage), to calculate SSIM and FSIM for color images, it would be better to convert the color image to gray image with the formula 0.2989R + 0.5870G + 0.1140B, and then calculate its SSIM and FSIM. Finally, SSIM and FSIM of Figure 17 (see Equation (5)).
In fact, we may further enhance R P by using W block instead of X block to generate (n − 2)
, where W block may be 7B2W or 8B1W. When using W = 6B3W, the approach changes back to the original (n, n)-SDIS. By this approach, the R P is enhanced to 7−3.5/n 9 and 8−5.5/n 9 for W = 7B2W and W = 8B1W, as derived in Equations (15) and (16), respectively.
Consider (n − 1)-colluder attack for the case using W block with Hamming weight w. The following theorem demonstrates the successful probability to recover the block B under (n − 1)-colluder attack. Theorem 6. When using W block in the proposed (n, n)-SDIS, the successful probability to recover the block B for (n − 1)-colluder attack is R P =
Proof. Suppose that using W block with Hamming weight w in step (S-2). Consider the case that colluders already have (n − 1) shadows (say B (1) − B (n−1) ) for reconstruction. Based on these (n − 1) shadows, colluders may guess the type of shadow block B (n) in the other shadow, The block B (n) has W block, X block and Y block with 2n−4 2n probability, 1 2n probability and 3 2n probability, respectively, which are derived below. Note: if W is 6B3W Equation (17) is reduced to Equation (12) .
There is probability to guess the correct block B when B (n) is W block, X block, and Y block, respectively. Therefore, the P P is calculated as follows.
The value of P P is , respectively, for large n. Even though these values are larger than
for using W block in step (S-2), it is still practically secure for applications. This is because our CP information is protected in the XOR-ed result, but not conveyed on b
(1) 9 in B (1) like (22)-SDIS [17, 19] . For example, when using 8B1W as W block. If colluders have (n − 1) shadows (say NS 1 − NS n−1 ), for a block B, they have the XOR-ed result B = B (1) ⊕ ... ⊕ B (n−1) , and can guess the shadow block B (n) is W block with a very high probability for large n (note: 2n−4 2n → 1 for large n). It implies that there is about 8 9 probability that the bit b 9 in B is the complementary bit b 9 of B . By using the same argument in proof of Theorem 5, for this case, the successful probability to recover a correct color in CP is P C = ( probability. This probability of guessing a color index is larger than the brute-force probability 1 256 . However, colluders do not have the correct CP, and thus they cannot recover the original SI. Obviously, it is more difficult to apply (n − 1)-colluder attack on using 7B2W as W block, because P C is ( 7 9 ) 24 0.0024. This is why we claim that using W block is still practically secure for applications.
To demonstrate the above phenomenon, we use 8B1W as W block in the proposed (5, 5)-SDIS. Five color meaning shadows using color cover images CCI 1 − CCI 5 in Figure 8a -e are illustrated in Figure 18a , where the approach of enhancing visual quality in Section 4.3 is also adopted. Figure 18b are the 256-color SI (Lena), and its corresponding CP. The recovered 256-color secret image SI and the color palette CP are shown in Figure 18c . It is observed that these five color meaning shadows in Figure 18a have high resolutions with R P = 8−5.5/n 9 = 0.767 for n = 5, which have better visual qualities than those in Figure 15b . From, Figure 18c , there is not any secret information of CP and SI leaked for (n − 1)-colluder attack. 
Comparison
We extend (2, 2)-SDIS to the proposed (n, n)-SDIS. Because the percentage of X block is greater than 50%, the resolution of binary and color meaningful shadows are enhanced. Note: Yang et al.'s (2, 2)-SDIS uses X block and Y block half and half, while Wei et al.'s (2, 2)-SDIS only uses Y blocks. On the other hands, Wei et al.'s (2, 2)-SDIS has the incorrect assignment of color palette data for the color index 255. This problem comes from from all-1 9-bit vector. In [19] , Yang et al. adopted a complicated approach using partitioned sets to address this problem. In the proposed (n, n)-SDIS, the number of shadows of (n, n)-SDIS is more than two, i.e., n ≥ 3. Thus, we can easily adopt a simple approach by reducing H(T) to H(T) = 7 in step (S-4) via modifying any one shadow block to solve this problem. Meantime, as described in Section 5.1, we may enhance R P and simultaneously retain the practical security by using W block.
As shown in Table 2 , a complete comparison is given among Wei et al.'s (2, 2)-SDIS, Yang et al.'s (2, 2)-SDIS, and the proposed (n, n)-SDIS. The comparison includes the structure of block, percentages of blocks, the region in color meaningful shadows revealing cover image, the contrast of binary meaningful shadows, enhancing R P , the embedding of color palette data, where to embed color palette data, enhancing visual quality of color meaningful shadows, encoding/decoding complexity, and the security. About the security, although the successful probability to recover B under (n − 1)-colluder attack P P = = 0.01. This value is still practical secure for practical application. Besides, the CP of the proposed (n, n)-SDIS cannot be obtained under (n − 1)-colluder attack, but the CP of (2, 2)-SDIS can be obtained from only one shadow. Based on this observation, the proposed (n, n)-SDIS is much securer than (2, 2)-SDIS. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we discussed the general (n, n)-SDIS, which can be applied to any n ≥ 3. The proposed (n, n)-SDIS is skilfully implemented on basis of previous (2, 2)-SDIS. Our main contribution is theoretically to prove the proposed (n, n)-SDIS being able to resist (n − 1) colluder attack. Meanwhile, the contrast of binary meaningful shadow and the region in color shadows revealing cover image are both enhanced. The main weakness of Wei et al.'s (2, 2)-SDIS is the incorrect assignment of color palette data for some color indices, and this is tackled by using partitioned sets in Yang et al.'s (2, 2)-SDIS. In the proposed (n, n)-SDIS, because of the number of shadows more than two, i.e., n ≥ 3, a simple approach reducing Hamming weigh of a temporary block can be adopted to easily solve this weakness. Since the proposed (n, n)-SDIS is based on color palette and resistant to (n − 1)-colluder attack, and also enhances the visual quality of meaningful shadows, it is suitable for modern visual communication applications where features such as secure transmission, storage sensitive, and high-quality image reconstruction are required.
